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ABSTRACT 
Most households in rural Madagascar are engaged in agriculture and derive a large share of their 
income from the production of food or cash crops and from animal husbandry. However, agricultural 
yields can be extremely volatile due to weather conditions, pests, insects, rodents and other calamities. 
As a result, households record large fluctuations in their incomes that must be dealt with. Since the 
usual consumption-smoothing market mechanisms are quite limited in the Malagasy context, 
households need to rely on nonmarket mechanisms or to adopt multi-faceted strategies to cope with 
risk. In this paper, we examine the possibility that parents obtain informal income insurance by letting 
their children work. We test this hypothesis by examining the relationship between household income 
shocks and human capital investment in children. In particular, we investigate whether children’s 
propensity to join school and to drop out of school responds to transient shocks. We also investigate 
issues such as gender and intrahousehold resource allocation. 
Key Words: Schooling decisions; Transitory shocks; Risk-coping strategies. 
RESUME 
La plupart des ménages ruraux malgaches tirent l’essentiel de leurs revenus de l’agriculture et sont 
exposés à un fort degré d’incertitude en raison de la fréquence et de l’intensité des aléas frappant les 
champs de culture ou les troupeaux. En l’absence de marchés du crédit ou de l’assurance, des moyens 
alternatifs pour éliminer ou atténuer les conséquences défavorables de cette incertitude doivent être 
trouvés par les ménages. Dans cet article, nous envisageons la possibilité que la mise au travail des 
enfants constitue un mécanisme de gestion des risques. Afin de tester cette hypothèse, nous examinons 
les déterminants de la scolarisation en cycle primaire d’un échantillon d’enfants issus de ménages 
ruraux. Nous examinons notamment le rôle des chocs de revenu subis par les ménages sur les 
probabilités d’entrée (dans) et de sortie hors de l’école de leurs membres en âge d’être scolarisés, en 
portant une attention particulière aux questions de genre et d’allocation intra-ménage des ressources. 
Les résultats indiquent que les chocs transitoires de revenu ont un impact significatif sur la probabilité 
de sortie de l’école mais pas sur la probabilité d’entrer à l’école. Cela suggère que la déscolarisation 
des enfants les plus âgés constitue un mécanisme de gestion du risque pour les ménages ruraux. 
Mots-clés : Décision de scolarisation ; Chocs transitoires ; Stratégies de gestion des risques 
JEL Code : D91; I21; J24; O55. 
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1. Introduction
Most households in rural Madagascar are engaged in agriculture and derive a large share of
their income from the production of food or cash crops and from animal husbandry. However,
agricultural yields can be extremely volatile due to weather conditions, pests, insects, rodents
and other calamities. As a result, households record large fluctuations in their incomes that must
be dealt with. Since the usual consumption-smoothing market mechanisms are quite limited in
the Malagasy context, households need to rely on nonmarket mechanisms or to adopt multi-
faceted strategies to cope with risk. Such coping strategies include drawing down liquid assets,
liquidating productive assets, borrowing from formal or informal lenders, increasing market
hours-of-work, etc. In this paper, we examine the possibility that parents obtain an informal
income insurance by letting their children work. Because our data set does not provide us
with detailed information on child labor, we test this hypothesis by examining the relationship
between household income shocks and human capital investment in children. In particular,
we investigate whether children’s propensity to join school and to drop out of school responds
to transient shocks1. We also investigate issues such as gender and intrahousehold resource
allocation.
Almost no studies except Jacoby & Skoufias (1997) for India, Jensen (2000) for Côte d’Ivoire
and Sawada (2003) for Pakistan have empirically explored the connection between financial
market imperfections and human capital investment. Yet this question is important for at
least two reasons. First, it can shed a new light on what determines child labor and may
consequently suggest new possible remedies for it. Indeed, if households’ incapacity to handle
1 It is not obvious, however, that for children school and work compete for time. Increasing hours of work may
simply crowd out leisure time and have no eﬀect on school attendance.
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temporary income shocks appears to be a more important determinant of school attendance than
poverty, it suggests that programs aimed at helping poor parents handle emergencies may be
more eﬀective in keeping poor children in school than program aiming either at reducing poverty
itself or at reducing school costs for the poor as a whole. Second, examining this question can
clarify one of the mechanisms through which transient poverty causes chronic poverty.
Using five rounds of household panel data from four regions of Madagascar, we find that
transitory income aﬀects children’s school dropout behaviors significantly. Our analysis also
suggests that parents in our sample favor girls in terms of education. Although this last result
might appear surprising, it is actually in line with existing studies on education in Madagascar
which generally find a ”negative” gender gap when focusing on school enrollment rates (see
e.g. Cogneau, Dumont, Glick, Razafindrakoto, Razafindravonona, Randretsa & Roubaud 2003).
Lastly, we find weak evidence of resource competition among siblings.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by briefly reviewing the literature on the use
of child labor as a form of self-insurance. The empirical strategy is then outlined in section 3.
In section 4, we describe our data. In section 5, we present the results. Section 6 concludes the
paper and suggests directions for future work.
2. Risk and Schooling Decisions: a Review
If the role of family income in determining child school attendance, enrollment or attainment
has been widely explored in the literature, the impact of income fluctuations on the dynamics
of school attendance and/or on child labor is comparatively a neglected issue even though
recent empirical studies have been partially filling the gap for the last ten years. Using the
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ICRISAT data set on a panel of Indian rural households, Jacoby & Skoufias (1997) examine
whether fluctuations in family income aﬀect school attendance in the face of financial market
incompleteness. They find that child school attendance does decline when poor households are
hit by a shock. They also find that school attendance is more responsive to aggregate than
to idiosyncratic shocks. Using data from the Côte d’Ivoire Living Standard Survey (CLSS),
Jensen (2000) find that school enrollment rates declined by between one-third and one-half in
regions that had adverse weather shocks in 1986 and 1987. Sawada (2003) examines the role
of permanent and transitory income changes in educational investments using household panel
data from rural Pakistan. Unlike Jacoby & Skoufias (1997), which analyzes the variability of
school attendance, the focus is on school entry and dropout behaviors. Results suggest that
transitory income aﬀects children’s school entry and dropout behaviors significantly and that
schooling response to transitory income is consistently larger for daughters than sons. In a
forthcoming paper using a panel data set in one region of Tanzania, Beegle, Dehejia & Gatti
(2006) find that transitory income shocks lead to increases in child labor and to decreases in
school attendance. They also find that households with assets are able to oﬀset approximatively
80% of these shocks.
The question of whether volatile income in an environment of imperfect insurance or capital
markets leads to lower investments in education has also been empirically investigated in urban
areas. Using longitudinal employment survey data collected in metropolitan Brazil, Duryea,
Lam & Levison (2003) find that an unemployment shock to the household head significantly
increases the probability that a child enters the labor force and decreases the probability that
she advances in school. Their estimates suggest that these eﬀects can be large, with increase of
as much as 60% in the probability of entering employment for 16 year-old girls. By contrast,
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Parker & Skoufias (2006) find that, in urban Mexico, time devoted by boys and girls to schooling
is unaﬀected by labor market shocks. However, when examining the eﬀect of the same shocks
on children’s school attendance in the next school year, the authors find a significant decrease in
the probability that the children will continue. The authors also find evidence of more eﬀective
eﬀorts to protect family investments on children’s human capital for boys than girls.
Finally, several studies have examined the role of cash transfers on households’ school en-
rollment and child work decision (see e.g. Skoufias & Parker 2001, Bourguignon, Ferreira &
Leite 2003, Schultz 2004, de Janvry, Finan & Sadoulet 2006). In a forthcoming paper, de Jan-
vry et al. (2006) examine whether children who benefit from Progresa conditional transfers in
rural Mexico are protected from the impacts of shocks on school enrollment and work. They find
that shocks such as unemployment or illness of the household head have large eﬀects in taking
children out of school and that because of strong state dependence, children who dropped out
of school are less likely to subsequently re-enroll. They also find that the Progresa transfers
completely protect children from the impact of shocks on school enrollment.
3. Empirical Strategy
Our goal is to estimate the extent to which school attendance responds to income fluctuations
under missing or incomplete credit and/or insurance markets. We do so in two steps. We first
derive an estimate of agricultural income shocks. We then regress schooling decisions (either to
enter into school or to dropout of school) on this estimate and other explanatory variables such
as child age.
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3.1. The first step
We adopt Paxson (1992)’s approach to construct our measure of transitory agriculture income
shocks by using the following regression equation:
Yirt = β0 +X
P
itβ1 +X
T
itβ2 +X
T
rtβ3 + (X
P
it
O
XTrt)β4 + λi + θt + ε
T
it
where Yirt denotes agricultural income accruing to household i in region r in year t. X
P
it is
a vector of physical and human assets - such as the demographic structure of the household,
detailed information on its land holdings and their quality, and physical assets; XTit is a vector
of household-specific shock variables and XTrt is a set of region-specific shocks - such as rainfall -
that aﬀect transitory income. XPit
N
XTrt is a cross-product term that is included in recognition
of the fact that the eﬀect of unexpected rainfall on agricultural income depends on farm char-
acteristics. Unobservable determinants of the permanent component of income are captured by
the household fixed eﬀect λi. Finally, θt is a time-specific fixed eﬀect and εirt is a random error
term. The fitted value of the third and fifth terms in the right-hand side, i.e., the fitted value of
XTitβ2 + (X
P
it
N
XTrt)β4, provides a consistent estimate of a component of income for household
i in period t that is transitory and could not be anticipated. It is this measure of transitory
income that will be used as a source of variation in our subsequent specifications.
Our specification diﬀers in three ways from Paxson (1992)’s. First, in Paxson’s income
equation, rainfall is not interacted with farm characteristics so that heterogeneity in households’
land holdings is not accounted for in her measure of transitory income shocks. Second, Paxson
uses cross-sectional data on farm household income and cannot control for unobserved household
fixed eﬀect. Third, Paxson ignores other possible types of shock (e.g., pests, thefts and rodents)
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that can potentially strongly (and unexpectedly) influence agricultural income.
3.2. The second step
The longitudinal structure of our data set allows us to classify the sampled children into one
of the following mutually exclusive categories: (i) no schooling; (ii) entrant; (iii) continuing
schooling and (iv) dropout. We follow Sawada (2003)’s approach and construct simple models
of binary dependent variables related to two sequential schooling decisions: whether to enter
into school and whether to drop out from school. We define two binary variables as follows:
ENTit = 1 if child enters school at time t
= 0 if child does not enter school at time t
DRPit = 1 if child drops out of school at time t
= 0 if child stays in school at time t
The entrant model is conditional on the sample of children without previous schooling
(S∗it−1 ≤ 0), i.e., children belonging to categories (i) or (ii), while the dropout model is con-
ditional on the sample of children with some schooling (S∗it−1 > 0), i.e., children belonging to
categories (iii) or (iv).
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The relevant conditional probabilities can be written as:
P (ENTit = 0) = P
¡
S∗it ≤ 0 | S∗it−1 ≤ 0
¢
= 1− F (αh +Xitπ) (3.1)
P (ENTit = 1) = P
¡
S∗it > 0 | S∗it−1 ≤ 0
¢
= F (αh +Xitπ) (3.2)
P (DRPit = 0) = P
¡
S∗it > 0 | S∗it−1 > 0
¢
= 1− F (γh +Xitβ) (3.3)
P (DRPit = 1) = P
¡
S∗it ≤ 0 | S∗it−1 > 0
¢
= F (γh +Xitβ) (3.4)
where αh and γh represent household specific fixed eﬀects and X is a vector of independent
variables including the transient income estimate constructed in step 1. We estimate these
models as discrete response models with household fixed eﬀects assuming that F (•) is a logistic
distribution function.
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data come from a survey jointly administered by Madagascar’s national statistical institute
(INSTAT) and the Institut de Recherche pour le Developpement (IRD) through the Project
MADIO (see e.g. Droy, Ratovoarinony & Roubaud 2000). The survey has been conducted every
year since 1995 in four distinct regions of the country. These regions diﬀer in terms of soil
quality, annual rainfall pattern, and population densities. They were chosen because each of
them illustrates at least one important issue in terms of agricultural development. In the first
round, approximately 500 households were randomly chosen in each region from an exhaustive
list. These households were surveyed again every year, and households that had moved or were
unwilling to be surveyed were replaced by new households with similar characteristics from the
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same region. The resulting sample consists of 5,046 households surveyed over the period 1995 to
2002. Unfortunately, not all survey rounds can be used for our study since some of the questions
related to education that we use to construct our in- and out-of-school variables were not asked
in 1996. Furthermore, only households with school-aged children are included in our sample.
As a result, the sample we use consists of about 2,200 households surveyed at least twice over
the period 1997 to 2002.
The data set has several features that make it particularly appropriate for the proposed
analysis. First, it provides rich and reliable information on production, assets and personal
characteristics of all household members including their school enrollment status. It also includes
detailed information on crop losses in each of the six rounds.
An important issue in the empirical analysis of panel data is the extent of sample attrition.
Even though there is no necessary relationship between the size of sample loss from attrition
and the existence or magnitude of attrition bias, we need to explore the determinants of panel
attrition and investigate whether it is selectively related to some variables of interest. In partic-
ular, given the focus of the paper, namely the occurence of shocks and their impact on schooling
decisions, we need to examine whether the likelihood of household or individual attrition is cor-
related with shocks. In order to do so, we conduct a dynamic attrition analysis by estimating
attrition hazards, i.e., probabilities of exiting the sample in the current period conditional on
being in the sample in the previous period, as a function of all the lagged variables of interest.
The model to be estimated is as follows:probabilities of exiting the sample in the current period
conditional on being in the sample in the previous period
Ait = f (shockst−1) +Xit−1θ + vit (4.1)
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where the outcome variable Ait equals 1 if the individual attrites at time t, conditional on still
being respondent at time t−1 (0 otherwise). It is a function of past shocks such as income shocks
or demographic shocks. The vector Xit−1 are lagged individual characteristics, with coeﬃcient
vector θ, and vit is an error term. In the empirical analysis, we also include year dummies
interacted with village dummies. Estimates are shown in Table 1. They reveal that attrition
propensity is not aﬀected by our measures of shocks, indicating that attrition bias should not
be a concern in our analysis. We likewise find that these variables are not significant predictors
of entry into the sample.2
In the first part of the empirical section, the dependent variable is a measure of income that
includes both cash and imputed value for in-kind income from various sources (farm production
which includes food and cash crops and animal husbandry; non farm production which includes
forestry, handicrafts, fishing and small trade; earnings from wage work; and rents from land).
Turning to our measures of income shocks, diﬀerent types and levels of risk are considered.
First, we use household level information on negative shocks resulting from pests, rodents, birds
or locusts. For each type of crop (rice, maize, roots and tubers), households were asked to
give a score of losses on their fields as well as on their stocks in each survey round. Shock
scores vary between 0 (no loss) and 3 (harvest reduced to nothing). We use this information
to measure transitory household-specific shocks. Second, region-specific risk, which aﬀects all
households in a given region, is captured by rainfall data. Both the standard deviation of
rainfall from its long-term average and its squared are included in the regression. Rainfall data
come from the NASA/GSFC Laboratory for Atmospheres as a contribution to the GPCP, an
international research project of the World Meteorological Organization’s Global Energy and
2Results are not reported but are available upon request.
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Water Exchange program.3 Third, in order to introduce some heterogeneity in household-level
sensitivity to climatic shocks, we introduce the cross-product of soil types and rainfall deviation
in rice-growing observatories (rice being the main food crop in Madagascar). Some descriptive
statististics on household-specific shocks are given in Tables 2, 3a and 3b. Although their
economic and agroclimatic environment diﬀer, all households in the sample face relatively high
levels of income risk. As highlighted by Table 2, the frequency of shocks over time is particularly
high in rice fields since nearly 33% of the 942 households that were interviewed in all five rounds
experienced shocks in their rice fields in four or five rounds. This proportion falls to 7.4%
when shocks in maize fields are considered. As pointed out by Beegle et al. (2006), the high
frequency of shocks in rice fields raises the concern that our shock measures might pick up
unobserved household characteristics rather than identifying an exogenous source of variation
in income. The inclusion of household fixed eﬀects in all subsequent specifications will at least
partially control for this. Tables 3a and 3b report the magnitude of shocks in rice and cassava
fields respectively in each survey round. While complete crop destruction is uncommon, shocks
appear to be substantial in magnitude : 20% of households on average report heavy losses in
their ricefields in each survey round. Moreover, shocks experienced by households in their fields
appear to be not purely idiosyncratic.
In the second part of the empirical section, the construction of the dependent variables of
the entry-drop out models is made possible by using information on schooling attendance from
the panel of individuals. Transitions in and out of school are then coded as described in section
3. Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of both dependent variables by age and gender. Not
3Detailed information is available at http://precip.gsfc.nasa.gov/ . Monthly ground measures on rainfall are
also available for each observatory but are missing for years 2001 and 2002. Correlations between these measures
and those provided by the NASA vary between 0.85 and 0.94 depending on the observatory under concern.
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surprisingly, the profiles indicate important variations with age: entry probability increases
steeply between age 4 to 7 - when it reaches a high of 35% for boys and 40% for girls - and
decreases afterwards; drop-out probability is lower than 10% under 12 and increases to reach
40% at age 18. Figure 3 confirms that the proportion of children involved in domestic and
agricultural labor increases with age.
In order to give some ground to the assumption that transitory shocks and schooling decisions
are connected, Table 4 reports the proportions of sample children who dropped out from school
in each observatory and each year, depending on whether their household experienced a shock
or not. No clear picture emerges from it. The figures reveal higher probabilities of dropping out
from school for children belonging to households having reported shocks in their ricefields in two
observatories out of three (Antalaha and Marovoay). But shocks in maize fields are paradoxically
associated with lower probabilities of dropping out from school in three observatories out of four.
Table 5 reports pair wise correlations of schooling rates at the household level, per capita
income mean and deviation, and rainfall deviation. While schooling rates appear to be strongly
correlates with mean per capita income in all observatories, they are significantly correlated
with income and rainfall deviation only in Antalaha and Tuléar. These results suggest that
schooling rates may be responsive to both idiosyncratic and common shocks at least for a subset
of households. This will be investigated more rigorously in the following section.
5. Empirical Results
In addition to the measures of shocks described in the previous section, the vector of regressors in
the income regressions includes rice field area, the percentage of irrigated land, the composition
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of the livestock owned by the household and the number of male and female elders, adults,
young adults, children aged between five and fifteen and children who are younger than five.
For the observatory of Antalaha, where a large share of cultivated land is devoted to vanilla,
the vector of regressors also includes variables related to the number of vanilla trees owned by
each household. Summary statistics by observatory are provided in Table 6.
Table 7 reports the fixed eﬀects estimates of the determinants of total income for each
observatory (Antalaha, Antsirabe, Marovoay and Tulear). For most of the variables, coeﬃcients
are in line with expectations. Rice land area is found to significantly raise total income and
so does the percentage of irrigated land. Family labor is also found to give positive returns.
For transitory shock variables, the deviation of annual rainfall from its long-term average has a
significant impact on income in all observatories. However, the eﬀect is positive in only three
observatories (Antalaha, Antsirabe and Tuléar) and negative for Marovoay. This last result
probably stems from the fact that most rice fields in Marovoay are irrigated and that heavy
rains could be detrimental to the irrigation infrastructure or to the capacity of households to
properly drain their fields. The eﬀet of rainfall on income is found to be convex rather than
concave in all observatories but Marovoay. There is also substantial variability across soil types
in the responsiveness of crop income to rainfall. Most of the other transitory shock variables are
found to negatively aﬀect crop income, even though coeﬃcients are not always significant. Rice
being by far the predominant culture in Marovoay, a negative shock in rice fields (interacted
with area planted in rice) is found to significantly decrease crop income. The same is true in
Antalaha and Tulear for maize production. Last, the null hypothesis that there are no household
fixed eﬀects is strongly rejected in all income regressions.
Variables used in the conditional logit estimations are described in Table 8. Next to the
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gender indicator variable, child-specific variables include child age (not reported), child’s relation
to head and rank among brothers and sisters, as well as the number of older and younger siblings
by gender. In addition to household fixed eﬀects, which capture both invariant and unobservable
characteristics of the households, we also introduce village-year fixed eﬀects to control for village-
level shocks or changes in the local availability of schools.
Tables 9 and 10 report the estimated coeﬃcients of the entrant and dropout models re-
spectively. Two alternative specifications are presented. In the first one, we use the transitory
income shock variable derived from the income regressions described above. In the second one,
in order to check for robustness, we use a more reduced-form specification where shocks incurred
by households in their ricefields are introduced directly in the equation. In order to account for
the relative importance of rice in households’ income-generating activities, this shock variable
is interacted with the size of land cultivated in rice. Unanticipated demographic events are also
accounted for through the introduction of a variable measuring the number of elderly household
members exiting the sample from one year to another.4
In the entrant model, the coeﬃcient of transitory income is positive but not significant,
implying that neither a positive income shock nor a negative one influences the probability
of entrance to school. On the other hand, the death (or moving-out) of an elderly household
member in the last 12 months is found to significantly decrease the probability of entrance
to school. Turning to child-specific variables, girls are found to have a consistently higher
probability to enter school than boys, and household heads appear to favour their own oﬀsprings.
4Unfortunately, the survey questionnaire does not allow to identify the causes of individual attrition. Our
assumption here is that death is the cause of attrition for most elderly members, even though some of them may
have decided to move out. Death is often synonymous of tremendous ritual expenditures and constitutes as such
a utility risk households have to deal with.
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The result for girls is not surprising in the Malagasy context and has been observed by other
researchers (see e.g. Cogneau et al. 2003). Results do not significantly diﬀer when one substitutes
reported shocks in ricefields for transitory change in household income (specification 2).
Turning to the dropout model, the coeﬃcient of transitory income is consistently nega-
tive, which implies that higher transitory income reduces the probability of dropping out from
schooland, by symmetry, that households facing negative shocks tend to withdraw their children
from school. This result suggests that households in rural Madagascar face binding borrowing
constraints and divert child time away from education when confronted with negative income
shocks. Results also indicate that having younger brothers increases the probability to drop out
from school. With the exception of age and rank among siblings, none of the other child-specific
variables is found to have discernable eﬀects on school dropout. Here again, substituting re-
ported shock in rice fields for transitory change in household income provides comparable results:
the bigger the magnitude of shock in rice fields and the bigger the size of land devoted to rice
cultivation, the higher the probability to drop out from school.
6. Conclusion
Consumption-smoothing market mechanisms are quite limited in the Malagasy context. As a
result, most rural households - whose incomes can be extremely volatile due to weather con-
ditions, pests, insects, rodents and other calamities - need to rely on nonmarket mechanisms
or adopt multi-faceted strategies to cope with risk. In this paper, we have examined whether
crop shocks and other types of shocks aﬀect schooling decisions for children. We argue that this
would indicate that parents obtain an informal income insurance by letting their children work.
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Using five rounds of household panel data from four regions of Madagascar, we investigated
whether children’s propensity to join school and to drop out of school responds to transient
shocks. We also investigated issues such as gender and intrahousehold resource allocation. In
order to do so, we first derived an estimate of agricultural income shocks and then regressed
schooling decisions (either to enter into school or to dropout of school) on this estimate and
other explanatory variables such as child age.
We find that transitory income aﬀects children’s school dropout behaviors significantly but
not school entrance. This result is consistent with the observation that children’s participation
to household chores and agricultural activities increases with age. Parents who need to put
their children to work will rely on their older rather than younger children. The probability of
school entrance appears nevertheless to be sensitive to shocks in the demographic structure of
the household since it is negatively correlated with the death or moving out of elderly household
members. Our analysis also suggests that parents in our sample favor girls in terms of education.
Lastly, we find weak evidence of resource competition among siblings.
The paper can be extended in two directions. First, in order to understand what types
of mecanisms could mitigate households reliance on children labor to cope with risk, it would
be interesting to investigate whether diﬀerent types of households respond to shocks diﬀerently.
Second, the paper would also benefit from a complementary empirical analysis of whether house-
holds facing more volatile income stream get lower education outcomes, as found by Kazianga
(2005) in Burkina Faso. This is left for further research.
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Table 1 - Dynamic attrition logit model with focus on lagged shocks 
 
Dependent variable is 1if individual attrites in current period, 0 otherwise 
 
 
  
Lagged individual characteristics 
 
 
Age 0.188 
 (0.000)*** 
 
Age squared -0.003 
 (0.008)*** 
 
Sex (1: Girl; 0: Boy) 0.169 
 (0.000)*** 
 
Child of head -0.548 
 (0.000)*** 
 
Rank if child of head -0.159 
 (0.000)*** 
Lagged household characteristics 
 
 
Consumption per capita (/1,000,000) -0.045 
 (0.658) 
 
Household size 0.093 
 (0.000)*** 
 
Lagged shock variables 
 
 
Transitory income 0.382 
 (0.212) 
 
Number of elderly members who either died or  moved out 0.116 
 (0.263) 
 
Village x Year dummies Included but not shown 
  
Intercept -4.338 
 (0.000)*** 
Number of observations 21,787 
Robust p values in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 2 - Frequency of shocks     
     
  Rice fields Maize fields 
Number of shocks across five survey 
rounds Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
0 29 3.1 366 38.9 
1 110 11.7 200 21.2 
2 213 22.6 171 18.1 
3 281 29.8 136 14.4 
4 227 24.1 58 6.2 
5 82 8.7 11 1.2 
Total 942 100 942 100 
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Table 3a - Magnitude of shocks on rice fields, by year  
   
Observatory Year No loss Moderate losses Heavy losses  
Harvest 
reduced to 
nothing 
Antalaha 1998 19.6% 56.7% 23.5% 0.2% 
  1999 38.8% 47.6% 13.6% 0.0% 
  2000 4.0% 27.0% 63.2% 5.7% 
  2001 33.3% 48.8% 17.4% 0.6% 
  2002 52.9% 20.6% 26.1% 0.3% 
Antsirabe 1998 50.6% 32.9% 16.1% 0.3% 
  1999 41.3% 35.1% 22.9% 0.7% 
  2000 8.4% 24.7% 66.1% 0.8% 
  2001 64.8% 15.9% 18.9% 0.5% 
  2002 67.3% 12.0% 19.5% 1.2% 
Marovoay 1998 58.3% 19.0% 22.6% 0.2% 
  1999 28.2% 20.0% 35.4% 16.3% 
  2000 44.1% 26.5% 24.4% 5.1% 
  2001 54.6% 24.9% 16.9% 3.7% 
  2002 53.2% 28.5% 17.7% 0.6% 
Note: In Tulear, the fourth observatory, households do not produce rice. 
      
      
Table 3b - Magnitude of shocks on cassava fields, by year  
      
Observatory Year No loss Moderate losses Heavy losses  
Harvest 
reduced to 
nothing 
Antalaha 1998 76.0% 15.8% 8.3% 0.0% 
  1999 81.9% 12.9% 4.9% 0.4% 
  2000 61.5% 13.2% 17.2% 8.0% 
  2001 96.9% 2.3% 0.8% 0.0% 
  2002 87.8% 7.5% 4.5% 0.2% 
Antsirabe 1998 82.3% 9.7% 8.0% 0.0% 
  1999 73.4% 11.8% 14.2% 0.7% 
  2000 53.9% 21.0% 24.3% 0.8% 
  2001 90.7% 2.8% 4.5% 2.0% 
  2002 99.0% 0.5% 0.5% 0.0% 
Marovoay 1998 97.6% 0.5% 2.0% 0.0% 
  1999 94.2% 2.5% 2.5% 0.8% 
  2000 95.5% 1.6% 2.5% 0.4% 
  2001 97.1% 2.3% 0.4% 0.2% 
  2002 97.3% 1.6% 1.2% 0.0% 
Tulear 1998 41.8% 32.6% 19.1% 6.5% 
  1999 68.8% 16.0% 10.7% 4.5% 
  2000 31.2% 10.3% 18.5% 40.0% 
  2001 32.8% 13.9% 36.8% 16.5% 
  2002 Not surveyed that year 
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Table 4 - Probability to drop out from school and shocks     
         
Shocks on rice fields        
         
  Antalaha Antsirabe Marovoay Tulear 
  
No loss 
Partial or 
complete 
loss 
No loss 
Partial or 
complete 
loss 
No loss 
Partial or 
complete 
loss 
No loss 
Partial or 
complete 
loss 
1998 4.3% 13.3% 9.0% 11.7% 15.6% 15.7% - - 
1999 15.0% 9.7% 16.4% 13.7% 12.6% 14.5% - - 
2000 5.3% 9.5% 13.6% 7.0% 12.4% 15.5% - - 
2001 8.8% 13.0% 12.3% 12.0% 10.6% 15.4% - - 
2002 5.9% 8.5% 14.6% 9.9% 12.0% 11.0% - - 
         
 
Shocks on maize fields       
         
  Antalaha Antsirabe Marovoay Tulear 
  
No loss 
Partial or 
complete 
loss 
No loss 
Partial or 
complete 
loss 
No loss 
Partial or 
complete 
loss 
No loss 
Partial or 
complete 
loss 
1998 10.8% 21.6% 8.9% 13.0% 15.6% 16.7% 17.6% 17.0%
1999 11.3% 20.0% 15.8% 13.8% 15.0% 5.0% 18.1% 11.9%
2000 8.7% 12.5% 6.3% 7.8% 14.8% 5.0% 16.6% 12.8%
2001 11.4% 18.8% 14.8% 10.3% 13.6% 6.8% 13.6% 13.3%
2002 7.1% 12.5% 12.7% 14.7% 12.0% 3.3% - - 
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Table 5 - Pairwise correlation of schooling rate, per capita income mean and deviation, and 
rainfall deviation (village level) 
 
  Antalaha Antsirabe Marovoay Tuléar 
Mean income per capita 0.095 0.180 0.150 0.073 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** 
       
Deviation of income per capita from  0.040 0.013 0.011 0.076 
long-term average (0.079)* (0.523) (0.609) (0.005)*** 
       
Deviation of rainfall from long-term average 0.063 0.007 0.022 0.065 
  (0.002)*** (0.705) (0.278) (0.008)*** 
p values in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6 -  Summary statistics of variables used in income regressions  
     
  Antalaha Antsirabe Marovoay Tulear 
Total annual household income 6,003,789 3,446,310 5,449,929 1,919,666 
  (7,549,550) (3,217,945) 5,430,779 2,481,261 
Physical Assets      
Number of vanilla trees aged 3- 304.5     
  (781.2)     
Number of vanilla trees aged 3-8 364.8     
  (942.7)     
Number of vanilla trees aged 8+ 123.0     
  (450.3)     
Land area (acres) 133.7 81.2 130.3   
  (117.1) (102.4) (140.1)   
% of irrigated land 0.27 0.79 0.68   
  (0.39) (0.34) (0.43)   
Number of bullocks 0.53 0.87 0.96 0.65 
  (1.26) (1.34) (2.14) (1.32) 
Number of buffalos 0.26 0.63 1.15 4.51 
  (0.86) (2.92) (5.17) (11.14) 
Number of cows 0.39 0.46 0.57 1.73 
  (3.67) (0.95) (2.75) (6.16) 
Number of pigs 0.20 0.55 0.26 0.01 
  (0.86) (1.21) (1.33) (0.48) 
Human Assets      
Number of children aged 5- 0.96 1.23 0.96 1.47 
  (0.95) (1.08) (0.99) (1.21) 
Number of children aged 5-15 1.56 1.66 1.55 1.76 
  (1.38) (1.41) (1.35) (1.65) 
Number of young adults aged 15-20 0.59 0.70 0.64 0.70 
  (0.83) (0.92) (0.88) (0.90) 
Number of adults aged 20-65 2.00 2.18 2.15 2.04 
  (0.93) (0.96) (1.05) (1.01) 
Number of elders aged 65+ 0.17 0.16 0.20 0.12 
  (0.44) (0.46) (0.47) (0.36) 
Shock Variables      
Rainfall deviation -17.5 -46.7 -61.4 -7.1 
  (164.8) (169.9) (112.6) (131.1) 
Rainfall deviation squared 27.5 31.0 16.4 17.2 
  (24.1) (29.7) (23.3) (21.0) 
Rice field shock 0.85 0.69 0.72 0.00 
  (0.82) (0.85) (0.92) (0.02) 
Rice field shock x area planted in rice 130.3 54.7 119.1   
  (201.0) (136.4) (279.5)   
Maize field shock 0.10 0.66 0.09 1.27 
  (0.44) (0.86) (0.39) (1.41) 
Other field shock 0.74 0.44 0.06 0.83 
  (0.98) (0.80) (0.31) (1.21) 
Tuber. Field shock 0.25 0.26 0.05 0.94 
  (0.62) (0.63) (0.30) (1.13) 
Number of observations 3,261 3,598 3,223 2,320 
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Table 7 – Fixed effects estimates of the determinants of income 
 
Dependent variable is log(total income) 
 Antalaha Antsirabe Marovoay Tulear 
Farm characteristics     
Number of vanilla trees aged 3- 0.0000    
 (3.19)***    
Number of vanilla trees aged 3-8 0.0000    
 (3.79)***    
Number of vanilla trees aged 8+ 0.0001    
 (3.13)***    
Land area (acres) 0.0010 0.0011 0.0016  
 (6.57)*** (7.21)*** (11.83)***  
% irrigated 0.0267 0.0319 0.0955  
 (0.83) (1.20) (3.37)***  
Number of children aged 5- 0.0432 0.0345 0.0136 -0.0204 
 (2.32)** (2.34)** (0.89) (0.53) 
Number of children aged 5-15 0.0774 0.0474 0.0342 0.0853 
 (4.96)*** (3.52)*** (2.75)*** (2.49)** 
Number of young adults aged 15-20 0.0918 0.0573 0.0885 0.0403 
 (4.49)*** (3.70)*** (5.48)*** (0.86) 
Number of adults aged 20-65 0.1223 0.0787 0.1320 -0.0525 
 (5.96)*** (4.69)*** (8.81)*** (1.15) 
Number of elders aged 65+ -0.0121 0.0160 0.0524 0.0805 
 (0.26) (0.31) (1.26) (0.51) 
Number of bullocks 0.0409 0.0584 0.0127 0.0815 
 (3.46)*** (5.57)*** (2.29)** (3.68)*** 
Number of buffalos 0.0238 0.0189 0.0113 0.0297 
 (1.55) (5.46)*** (5.33)*** (8.98)*** 
Number of cows 0.0088 0.0828 0.0224 0.0181 
 (0.58) (7.13)*** (6.28)*** (3.32)*** 
Number of pigs 0.0140 0.0350 0.0026  
 (1.03) (4.46)*** (0.37)  
Rainfall Variables     
Rainfall deviation from long-term average 0.0014 0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0032 
 (11.37)*** (3.04)*** (8.89)*** (5.30)*** 
Rainfall deviation squared(a) 0.0222 0.0013 -0.0008 0.0245 
 (23.60)*** (2.88)*** (1.09) (5.99)*** 
Rainfall deviation x Plain area(a) -0.0022 -0.0008 0.0008  
 (3.50)*** (0.61) (1.40)  
                            x Low ground area(a) -0.0029 -0.0002 -0.0017  
 (1.08) (0.25) (0.43)  
                            x Tavy area(a) 0.0064 -0.0304 0.2074  
 (0.76) (2.67)*** (1.45)  
                            x Tanety area(a) -0.0002 0.0094 -0.0068  
 (0.15) (3.80)*** (1.62)  
Other Transitory Shock Variables     
Rice field shock x area planted in rice -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0003  
 (5.02)*** (0.78) (6.27)***  
Maize field shock -0.0300 -0.0086 -0.0757 -0.0038 
 (1.18) (0.73) (3.06)*** (0.14) 
Other field shock -0.0323 -0.0099 -0.0129 0.0334 
 (2.32)** (0.85) (0.45) (1.15) 
Tuber. field shock 0.0141 0.0047 0.0381 0.0094 
 (0.77) (0.33) (1.23) (0.27) 
Year dummies Included but not shown 
Constant 13.7386 14.1109 14.3498 12.9852 
 (194.79)*** (233.10)*** (283.89)*** (80.07)*** 
Number of observations 3,261 3,597 3,223 2,320 
Number of households 1,235 847 1,094 996 
R-squared 0.37 0.12 0.24 0.17 
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Table 8 - Summary statistics of variables used in entrant and dropout models 
 
 Entrant model Dropout model 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables     
P(Enter) 0.271 0.444   
P(Drop out)   0.182 0.386 
Independent variables     
Sex (1: Girl; 0: Boy) 0.482 0.500 0.489 0.500 
Age 6.3 2.1 12.1 3.1 
Child of head 0.817 0.387 0.881 0.324 
Rank if child of head 3.4 2.8 3.5 2.4 
Number of older sisters 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.1 
Number of older brothers 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.2 
Number of younger sisters 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.1 
Number of younger brothers 0.8 0.9 1.4 1.3 
Number of elderly members who either 
died or moved out 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 
Transitory change in household income -0.030 0.097 -0.042 0.110 
Rice field shock x rice area 98.7 213.7 128.7 238.8 
Number of observations 5,789  6,379  
Number of households 996  713  
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 Table 9 - Conditional logit of entrant model 
 
 (1) (2) 
Characteristics of the child   
Sex (1: Girl; 0: Boy) 0.455 0.463 
 (0.004)*** (0.003)*** 
Child of head 1.902 1.901 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Rank if child of head -0.130 -0.128 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Age dummies Included but not shown 
Number of siblings   
Number of older sisters -0.010 -0.008 
 (0.913) (0.935) 
Number of older brothers 0.029 0.019 
 (0.747) (0.826) 
Number of younger sisters 0.156 0.143 
 (0.127) (0.158) 
Number of younger brothers 0.086 0.076 
 (0.389) (0.446) 
Shock variables   
Number of elderly members who either died or moved out -2.894 -2.907 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Transitory change in household income 0.278  
 (0.697)  
Rice field shock x rice area  -0.000 
  (0.989) 
Village x year dummies Included but not shown 
 
Number of observations 5,789 5,848 
Number of households 996 1005 
p values in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 10 - Conditional logit of dropout model 
 
 (1) (2) 
Characteristics of child   
Sex (1: Girl; 0: Boy) -0.119 -0.110 
 (0.405) (0.442) 
Child of head -0.134 -0.127 
 (0.599) (0.619) 
Rank if child of head -0.097 -0.104 
 (0.021)** (0.013)** 
Age dummies Included but not shown 
   
Number of siblings   
Number of older sisters -0.043 -0.036 
 (0.621) (0.675) 
Number of older brothers 0.084 0.081 
 (0.323) (0.340) 
Number of younger sisters 0.122 0.123 
 (0.141) (0.134) 
Number of younger brothers 0.199 0.195 
 (0.013)** (0.014)** 
Shock variables   
Number of elderly members who either died or moved out 0.588 0.599 
 (0.104) (0.096)* 
Transitory change in household income -1.534  
 (0.007)***  
Rice field shock x rice area  0.000 
  (0.044)** 
Village x year dummies Included but not shown 
 
Number of observations 6,379 6,430 
Number of households 713 718 
p values in parentheses      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Figure 1 - Probability of school entry by gender 
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Figure 2 - Probability of school dropout by gender 
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Figure 3 - Percentage of boys and girls involved in household duties  
or agricultural labor, 2002 
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